The financial crisis and the role played within it by fluctuations in house prices has reopened the debate about whether monetary policy should respond to asset prices. This paper investigates how the central banks of the euro area, the UK and the US considered, understood and responded to the trends in house prices in the six or seven years preceding the crisis, and how they have analysed those developments since the crisis. It suggests that these central banks, particularly the Anglo-Saxon ones, might have been able to take some useful action if they had devoted more intellectual resources to analysing the possible misalignments of house prices and been willing to act on them.
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decide not to change interest rates even if she thinks the answer to (1) is yes, or indeed without making up her mind on (1).
On both the Federal Open Markets Committee (FOMC) and the Monetary Policy
Committee (MPC), those committee members with more economic training and/or stronger academic backgrounds tend to spell out their positions more clearly; they do this typically in separate speeches rather than in the discussions reported in the minutes, and these speeches are cited below where relevant. For other committee members and for the committees as a whole, it is not possible to identify precise positions in terms of the decision tree. But it turns out that, largely because the minutes (and other sources) provide explanations of interest rate decisions, it is still possible to draw some substantial conclusions from the evidence available.
Section II sets out, for each of the Federal Reserve Board (Fed), the Bank of England (BoE), and the European Central Bank (ECB), the coverage of and attention to house prices by the monetary policymakers over the period, with the focus on the processing of information about house prices, its role in their decisions and their attitudes to the wider issue of whether policy should respond to asset prices. Section III offers a comparative assessment of the positions and actions of the three banks, relating them to the nodes of Rudebusch's decision tree. Section IV reviews later work on the issue, undertaken with hindsight, which has emerged from the three central banks, notably Bernanke (2010) , Dokko et al. (2009 Dokko et al. ( , 2011 , Bean et al. (2010) and Clerc and Mojon (2011) . Section V offers an evaluation of that work, again with reference to the decision tree. Section VI summarises the findings.
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II.
Monetary policymakers and house prices in the run-up to the crisis 4 The Federal Reserve Board to real estate as well as equity prices but focused mainly on the latter; the speech set out the standard orthodoxy, in particular regarding the difficulty of identifying bubbles, but did not discuss specific structural factors affecting house prices. there are a number of analyses of housing finance (including equity withdrawal).
However, a 2003 Fed discussion paper by Gallin presented evidence against the conventional view that there was a stable long run relationship between the level of house prices and the fundamentals in the form of per capita income.
By 2004 house prices had been rising more rapidly than inflation for seven years, and house prices come to be mentioned more frequently (but still not regularly) in the FOMC minutes, and rather more frequently in the transcripts. 10 However, house price inflation does not seem to have played a role in interest rate decisions; the rises in 2004, for example, were typically explained in terms of the wider economic expansion and signs of incipient rise in inflation. 11 Another discussion paper by Gallin (2004) (the only other Fed discussion paper that addresses house prices over this period) examined the relationship between house prices and rents, and found (p3) that 'periods in which house prices are high relative to rents appear to be followed by periods in which real rent growth is faster than usual and real house price growth is slower than usual, and that the response of prices dominates that of rents'. He thought the currently low value of the rent/price ratio might indicate the existence of a housing bubble, but he set out several caveats (e.g data issues, the simplicity of the model used) against rushing to such a judgment. In the December 2004 FOMC meeting
Kohn referred to recent rises in house prices as 'astonishing' and possibly presaging a fall, but he remained 'convinced that our best approach to asset-price concerns is to 8 react, possibly aggressively, to the combination of asset-price movements as it occurs.
Such a strategy can be reasonably successful in counteracting the effects of even a large movement in asset prices, and it avoids making policy errors by acting in anticipation of asset-price changes that don't occur or are quite delayed.' (transcript, p. 47).
In June 2005 the FOMC meeting included a substantial discussion of house prices and monetary policy. Of the five staff presentations, Gallin presented an analysis of the rent/price ratio, which suggested that houses could be as much as 20% overvalued.
Lehnert examined the risk exposure of borrowers and lenders, which he concluded was not particularly high (though it would be put under pressure by a sharp house price correction). Peach considered whether the house price/income ratio had really risen, with particular attention to different house price indices and other data issues; in general he played down the probability that there had been a large rise. Rudebusch presented his decision tree in a discussion of the wider issue of whether monetary policy should respond to asset prices. Williams examined the economic costs of a collapse of a housing bubble, arguing that the costs might not be so high and that using monetary policy to reduce a misalignment would be very difficult. The discussion that followed focused on the identification of and the contribution of changes in land prices, the role of financial innovations, the question of whether house prices were really misaligned, and wider issues about the monetary policy response to asset prices. There was no clear agreed outcome to the discussion, but a number of participants clearly felt reassured by the implication that any overvaluation may have been limited in size and by the implication that monetary policy would have a reasonable chance of dealing with the likely magnitude of house price correction 9 without major economic cost. 12 The summary of the discussion of this item in the minutes says:
'Prices of houses in the United States had risen sharply in recent years, especially in certain areas of the country, to very high levels relative to incomes or rents. In addition to local market factors, a wide range of influences appeared to be supporting home prices, including solid gains in disposable income, low mortgage rates, and financial innovation in the residential mortgage market. Prices might be somewhat above the levels consistent with these underlying factors, but measuring the extent of any overvaluation either nationally or in regional markets posed considerable conceptual and statistical difficulties… the rise in house prices had been accompanied by a modest shift toward potentially riskier types of mortgages...
Nonetheless, financial institutions generally remained in a comfortable capital position… loan-to-value ratios had fallen.'
There are also a few more extended discussions of house prices and their possible overvaluation around this time in speeches by Ferguson (2005) and Kohn (2005 Kohn ( , 2006 . However, a notable feature of these speeches, as well as of the minutes, is the lack of any sense of alarm at the ongoing house price inflation.
In to raise the repo rate, it would be important for the Committee to make clear that this did not imply that it was targeting house price inflation, or any other asset price.' ( §28). In the second half of the year it became clear that house price inflation was declining, and it continued to do so until it came roughly into line with goods and services inflation in summer 2005. In September Nickell (2005) was able to argue that there had been a housing price boom but no crash, and that 'commentators (either implicitly or explicitly) disagreed significantly on the long-run equilibrium level of house prices, on where house prices were heading and on the extent to which there was a misalignment or bubble ' (2005: 14) . He then discussed in detail the rise in the equilibrium house price/earnings ratio, concluding that it was impossible to tell whether there had been a bubble at all. 17 He also argued that if it had wanted to have a significant impact on house prices the MPC would have had to raise interest rates by 14 some 300 basis points for three years, and this would have cut GDP growth and caused a large undershoot of the inflation target. growth was high, and Germany and Austria where it was very low. These divergences are attributed to differences in the local character of housing markets, demographic trends and interest rate changes since the late 1990s.
22
The ECB took a different attitude from the Fed and the BoE to the issue of the appropriate response of monetary policy to asset prices. A speech by Issing (2003) had shown some cautious and qualified sympathy for some of the arguments of Cecchetti et al. (2000) , and argued that the ECB's monetary pillar would provide an early warning of excessive credit expansion which might cause an asset price bubble.
These arguments are set out more fully in an article in the April 2005 MB, with a wider perspective which also includes material on how stock and house price overvaluations might be detected (with applications to Japan in the 1980s and 1990s
rather than the euro area). 
III. Assessment and comparison
The three central banks each had more or less adequate data on house prices -though the UK data were probably better than the US data in the earlier years, and the data for the euro area were initially quite poor. The three banks also had a common understanding of the analytical relations between mortgage credit and house prices, and between house prices and consumption. But their interest in and attention to house prices varied considerably.
The Fed paid remarkably little attention to house prices except for the 2005 FOMC meeting where they were specifically discussed; and house prices are almost never cited in the rationales for policy decisions in the pre-crisis years. Kohn (2008) noted later, with reference to Gallin (2004) and McCarthy and Peach (2005) , that Fed staff 'arrived at a wide range of answers… Thus, controversy over the existence of a bubble persisted almost right up to the actual peak in the housing market.' A further complicating factor was probably the heterogeneity of house price movements across the US. However, the fact that house prices were only rarely discussed and the lack of reference to house prices in policy rate decisions before the crisis struck suggest that the FOMC as a whole was so firmly committed to the orthodox view -notably that asset price misalignments (which were still thought of mainly in terms of stock prices) cannot be identified, and any adverse effects can be dealt with adequately if and when they are realised -that it failed to allocate substantial intellectual or time resources to the issue. In terms of Rudebusch's decision tree, the overall view of the FOMC is probably best characterised as an unequivocal no to question (2) (would bubbles cause macro problems that policy could not easily deal with?), such that it was not necessary to decide on (1) (can a bubble be identified?), or indeed (3) (is monetary policy a good tool to deflate the bubble?).
The BoE was also clearly wedded to the orthodoxy, but it felt that it was necessary to argue the case in a more serious way. The Committee as a whole, and some of its external members in particular, consistently articulated the orthodox view that monetary policy should respond to asset prices including house prices only insofar as price movements had implications for aggregate demand and inflation. Despite comments in the press (referred to in Nickell, 2002b) and occasional statements elsewhere, 25 there is no reason to doubt that the committee as a whole was indeed concerned essentially with the implications of house prices and household 20 indebtedness for consumer spending and demand, and that the policy decisions it took were taken on that basis. The only arguments in favour of a monetary response to house prices as such were by dissenting members of the committee, e.g. Wadhwani (2002, cited above) . 26 In the first half of the decade the orthodox view was buttressed by arguments that structural factors were responsible for a significant rise in the equilibrium house price/earnings ratio, so that the rise in the actual ratio was not, or at least not necessarily, indicative of a bubble. However, when house price growth accelerated again in 2006-7 such arguments were strangely absent. The BoE seems to have lost its focus on the issue at a time when claims that house prices were not overvalued would have been increasingly hard to substantiate, and when it might have been increasingly useful to have taken some action. In terms of Rudebusch's decision tree, the overall position of the MPC involved a much firmer no to (1) than that of the FOMC, backed up by a no to (2) and, in the case of Nickell's (2005) speech, a no to (3).
The ECB was always in principle more open to policies of the leaning against the wind (LATW) type. Despite the data problems it faced it devoted considerable resources to the issue of house price overvaluation, though it also argued that its monetary pillar or analysis should ensure an appropriate response of policy to asset prices. 27 Overall, the ECB was clearly aware of the risk of a house price boom (and bust), and it monitored house prices with increasing attention through the mid-2000s.
In particular it believed it had identified signs of house price overvaluation in some countries in early 2006. However, the extent to which particular policy rate decisions were driven directly by house price considerations is unclear, since there were always other factors mentioned in the MB as well or instead. There may have been some additional indirect influence via money and credit growth, but that was typically a secondary back-up factor in the MB editorials' rationales for interest rate decisions rather than the dominant factor. It is also possible that house price inflation in the euro area just did not reach the level at which the ECB would have reacted strongly, because high inflation in some countries was offset by low or zero inflation in others.
Moreover, when house price inflation started to fall it fell more rapidly in countries which had experienced higher inflation before, and this tendency towards a reconvergence could be taken as reducing the need for policy action. In terms of the decision tree, the ECB spent much more effort on thinking about (1), and answered yes at least in part and some of the time to both (1) and (2), but its policy actions were also probably limited by the heterogeneity of house price movements in the euro area, which would have weakened its yes to (3).
IV. Hindsight
Given the above characterisations of the three central banks' views on house prices in the run-up to the crisis, it is natural to ask whether they have changed their views since. While the house price falls that occurred with the crisis do not themselves prove that there had previously been a house price bubble, none of the three central banks considered here have tried to argue that there had in fact been no bubble. ECB economists, in the form of Gattini and Hiebert (2010) , have accepted that there was a house price bubble in the euro area, but the Fed and the BoE have largely ignored the issue. Instead, they have tried to address the possibility that they themselves had contributed to the boom and bust which, if it were true, would also imply that it would have been better if they had acted otherwise.
22
Fed Chairman Bernanke was the first to do this, in a speech in January 2010 which focused on two issues. First, he rejected Taylor's (2007) implemented by a series of interest rate surprises). The result was that GDP growth would have been strongly affected, but house price inflation and credit growth much less.
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Finally, while there is no ECB paper which addresses these issues, Clerc and Mojon (2011) from the Banque de France estimated a panel VAR for eleven euro area countries which included a survey measure of banks' willingness to lend. It turned out that credit growth had a big effect on GDP and inflation, but monetary policy had only a small effect on credit supply and most of the variation in credit growth was due to credit-specific shocks. Thus, 'a different monetary policy in the euro area could have had only a very limited impact on credit growth ' (2011: 276) . 28 They then used the DSGE model of Antipa, Mengus and Mojon (2010) to analyse the determinants of the euro area credit cycle, and found that monetary policy shocks had only a small impact on credit, house prices and GDP. They also emphasised the wide differences between euro area countries in terms of credit growth (and house price growth), despite the common monetary policy.
V. Evaluation
These studies have two key points in common: first, the proposition that it was not monetary policy that was responsible for the high rates of house price inflation; and second, the argument that higher interest rates would have had damaging effects on economic activity and growth but only a small restraining effect on house price inflation. In terms of the decision tree, at a time when it was perhaps more difficult to say no to (1) and (2), these arguments amounted to a firm no to question (3). In principle, a no to question (3) obviates the need to decide one way or the other on (1), and provides a rationale for the pursuit of the standard policy which takes no account of asset prices (beyond their implications for aggregate demand and inflation). On the other hand, the calls from central banks for additional macroprudential instruments implicitly accept the need for closer monitoring of asset prices.
However, a couple of points should be noted in passing. First, the importance ascribed in these studies to house price and credit shocks suggests that there remain considerable gaps in our understanding of how house prices are determined, so it would be wrong to draw strong inferences from the results.
Secondly, the counterfactual simulations carried out by Dokko et al. (2009 Dokko et al. ( , 2011 and Bean et al. (2010) show the effects of a change in policy, from orthodox policy to LATW, in the course of the house price boom, which is surely not the right way to assess the efficiency of the proposal for a (permanent) policy of LATW. 29 Dokko et al. (2009 Dokko et al. ( , 2011 23 See also Trichet (2005) , and the ECB working paper by Detken and Smets (2004) which distinguishes between high-cost and low-cost asset price booms and finds that the former but not the latter are associated with high rates of monetary and credit expansion. This work is taken further in Adalid and Detken (2007) . 24 The ECB also published a structural issues report on housing finance in the euro area in March 2009, but this did not cover house prices.
25 See for example, Roubini (2006: 98) , the comments by Poole cited in note 16, and the FOMC transcript for January 2003, p. 77. 26 The only other possible case seems to have been in June 2002, when King argued unsuccessfully for a rise in interest rates, which he said 'might also provide a useful signal, to consumers and to house buyers, which could reduce the extent to which interest rates might ultimately need to rise' (Minutes, §25). 28 However, since credit and house price growth varied widely between countries and the model included relatively few other country-specific distinguishing features, it is not surprising that the authors found that the common monetary policy had limited effects. 29 The LATW proposal has always contained the idea of an effect on and via expectations. Cecchetti et al. (2002: 3) , for example, argue that 'if it were known that monetary policy would act to "lean against the wind" in this way, it might reduce the probability of bubbles arising at all, which would also be a contribution to greater macroeconomic stability.'
30 See Assenmacher-Wesche and Gerlach (2010: 473) for a more complete view of the Lucas Critique issue. They argue that 'a leaning-against-the-wind policy could be thought of as an entirely new policy framework in which the central bank announces that it will react to financial imbalances and in doing so engenders stabilizing expectations. If this description is correct, there are no estimates that can be used to evaluate the effects of such a policy.' However, they go on to dismiss the argument, saying, 'since the estimates presented above suggest that a leaning against-the-wind policy would be costly in terms of real economic activity foregone, such policies must be adopted in the firm belief that the macroeconomic effects estimated here do not come to pass. That is quite a stretch.' But if the estimates have been made without taking account of changes in expectations, the effects are likely to have been 
